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The purpose of this comment letter is to bring to the IASB’s attention research that applies to 
the issues discussed in the exposure draft. The authors thus attempt to make an academically 
based comment, and will only incidentally make comments on issues arising in practice. 
The proposals presented by the IASB and articulated in the exposure draft on Fair Value 
Measurement, are predominantly based on FASBs Statement no. 157 and represent not only 
another move toward convergence of the two constituencies’ accounting practices but also a 
step closer to the realization of what has been termed the fair value paradigm (Hitz 2007; 
Shortridge and Smith 2009).  
The objective is the development of a consistent framework on fair value that would replace the 
piecemeal guidance dispersed throughout many IFRSs. As such, consistency in the proposed 
standard is sought after by the authors, as is clarity. Although a discussion of the merits of fair 
value as a measurement basis is asked to be restricted by the Board, we find it fruitful to 
attempt to evaluate the proposed standard not only on the basis of the two above-mentioned 
criteria, but also on how well it stands up to scrutiny both theoretically and empirically. Some 
research discussed below is a priori, but representative a posteriori research is also reflected 
upon, the arguments and conclusions from both types echoing the most prominent views 
presented here. 
Our comment is organized as follows: First, we present prior research, by method, starting with 
empirical research, which is followed by theoretical research. Second, we provide answers to 
some questions asked in the Exposure Draft. 
 
Empirical evidence from the market-based accounting research field of value-
relevance of fair value 
Before considering the meaning of fair value on a more theoretical basis, we first review the 
evidence from empirical studies within the market-based accounting research field to assess the 
alleged merit of fair value accounting. This evidence is, by and large, inconclusive; only where 
financial instruments are concerned is the picture less ambiguous.  
                                                 
1 The document has benefited from comments provided at a seminar at the University of Gothenburg, by Thomas 
Braun, Sten-Eric Ingblad, Marie Lumsden, Pernilla Lundqvist, Anna-Karin Pettersson and Asgeir Torfason. 
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Many of the early studies look at the value-relevance of fair value disclosures under SFAS No. 
107 in order to find evidence that investors price fair value. One of these studies, carried out by 
Barth (1994), looks at banks’ investment securities and the incremental value-relevance of fair 
value disclosures as compared with historical costs. The author finds that fair values of this 
particular financial instrument can explain security prices, but that gains and losses in the 
studied securities are not value-relevant for fair value measurements, possibly as a result of the 
accumulation of estimation error (as expressed in (Penman 2007): “with random errors in both 
the opening and closing balance sheet – bias aside – the errors are compounded in the income 
statement”).  
According to Eccher et al. (1996), fair value disclosures in commercial banks are associated 
with security prices, both alone and incrementally to benchmark book values, although in the 
latter case results are inconsistent over the studied period, any consistency observed pertaining, 
in addition, to investment securities only. Importantly, book values are more value-relevant on 
the whole than fair value disclosures. The results of Park et al. (1999) about fair value 
disclosures for investment securities and bank equity produce similar conclusions. 
The regression model in (Barth et al. 1996), building on other specifications and controlling for 
certain variables, yield results that are more supportive of fair value disclosures, since in 
addition to investment securities, loans and long-term debt are shown to be value-relevant 
(deposits and off-balance sheet items are notably not). Raised reliability issues are thereby 
attenuated as far as loans are concerned.  
This can be seen as a direct response to a contemporary with the study above, (Nelson 1996), 
whose results offer a different picture. Examining also fair value disclosures under SFAS no. 
107, the study shows that fair values of investment securities in commercial banks have some 
incremental value-relevance to book values, but fair value disclosures of most other financial 
instruments, such as loans, long-term debt, deposits and off-balance sheet items, have no ability 
to explain security prices. 
Another often cited study strengthens the support for fair value measurement, however, by 
showing that off-balance sheet items, specifically bank derivatives, are indeed value-relevant as 
measured by the stock price association with fair value disclosures (Venkatachalam 1996). 
Furthermore, (Hodder et al. 2006) look at volatility levels of different income measures in 
commercial banks, and conclude that while the full-fair-value construct displays a much higher 
volatility than the other income measures, this volatility is representative of market-based risks 
and therefore has value-relevance for investors.  
The results in (So and Smith 2009) indicate that the placement of the fair value information 
matters; fair values of investment properties in the income statement are to a higher degree 
reflected in market returns than fair value changes in the revaluation reserve, which may be 
considered as confirmation of the importance and value-relevance of the fair value measure.  
The support for fair value is extended further by Barth and Clinch (1998), who show that in an 
Australian setting, where such practices are permissible, revaluations of not only financial but 
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also tangible and intangible assets are value-relevant, thus suggesting that fair value 
measurements for many types of assets also would be used by investors in security pricing. 
Meanwhile, Carroll et al. (2003) find that reliability issues when assets are measured at fair 
value in thin non-active markets are not as severe as feared: evidence from closed-end funds 
shows consistent value-relevance even for such fair value estimates (based on the association 
between share prices and investment securities as well as between stock returns and gains and 
losses in securities).  
Although, as indicated above, there is evidence that value-relevance may exist for not only 
financial instruments in so-called thin markets where market prices are not readily available but 
also for non-financial assets, this is enshrouded in substantial controversy. Doubts as to the 
existence and extent of value-relevance of fair value arise when measurements rather become 
estimates. At the core of all this we find a “reliability debate”. Such a debate can be carried out 
on the basis of fair value measurements in general, but for model-based measurements in 
particular.  
Whereas the exit price (to be discussed in more depth below) has verifiability merits when 
active markets exist, (more or less severe) estimation difficulties surrounding the determination 
of fair values using level 2 and level 3 inputs are expected in the case of many non-financial 
assets where there are no active markets. The resulting measurement errors may be classified, 
as in (Barth and Landsman 1995), as “unsystematic” in the sense that they are entirely random, 
or “systematic” to the extent that management’s discretionary behavior strategically biases 
estimates. The potential existence of unsystematic measurement errors is returned to in our 
theoretical discussion; meanwhile, the empirical case for the latter scenario is inconclusive. For 
instance, whereas Beaver and Venkatachalam (2003) show that loan fair values contain 
measurement errors affecting their reliability, the discretionary components are still found to be 
value-relevant; Barth and Clinch (1998) further show that investors do not ostensibly 
distinguish valuations made by independent appraisers as opposed to directors, meaning 
potential manipulation of values by management is offset by the added benefits of private 
information. This is echoed by (Aboody et al. 1999), who look at revaluation of fixed assets 
and future firm performance. Then again, the value-relevance of asset revaluations is shown to 
be less in firms with a high debt-to-equity ratio, suggesting investors hold reservations toward 
revaluations made by financially distressed firms. The results in (Dietrich et al. 2000), related 
to investment property estimates under fair value, are even less supportive of reliability claims 
for assets where fair value estimates are exposed to managerial discretion. Similarly, Nissim 
(2003) sets up proxies for management incentives and provides some evidence that banks 
manage the fair values of loans, a financial instrument for which market prices are frequently 
absent (cf. Barth et al. 1996; Nelson 1996). Another related study looks at the recognition of 
acquired brands by UK firms; given that voluntarily recognizing an acquired brand and 
separating it from goodwill allows for impairment tests to replace the immediate write-offs 
otherwise required for goodwill at the time, the author concludes that a corrosion in reported 
asset values may thus be avoided, which in turn allows firms to act on the incentive to cut 
contracting costs associated with London Stock Exchange shareholder approval for future 
acquisitions and disposals (Muller 1999). 
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A recent study on investment fund and real estate companies (Danbolt and Rees 2008) show 
that for both industries, fair value accounting explains stock market returns better than 
historical costs.2 However, full-fair-value accounting is rejected based on that their regression 
results display evidence of difficulties in determining non-financial asset fair values, as the 
explanatory power of fair value earnings in the real estate industry is considerably lower than 
for the investment fund industry. Earnings management for the real estate industry, where 
assets are deemed more difficult to estimate, is an inference they draw from their results.  
A direct implication from the argument above is that the merits of fair values for level 3 inputs 
should be questioned. We will keep this in mind as we proceed with some theoretical 
considerations below. 
Before doing that, however, we will summarize Barth et al (2008), a study that focuses on the 
relevance of measuring liabilities at fair value. A concern that has been raised relating to the 
fair value measurement of liabilities is that a decline in credit rating will result in a gain and a 
resulting increase in equity. This effect is seen as counterintuitive, for example by the European 
Central Bank, and contrary to the interests of prudent bank regulators (in industries with 
regulated minimum capital requirements). Barth et al, however, find that realized gains are 
superseded by larger losses realized in assets. The reason for a downgrade in ratings is that the 
firm is doing poorly, which is reflected in a decline in asset values. Thus, as long as both 
liabilities and assets are valued at fair value, the concern of e.g. the ECB appears to be not 
applicable. 
 
Theoretical considerations regarding the implications behind the fair value 
definition and fair value as a measurement basis 
In kindred spirit to the Board’s view, Barlev and Haddad (2007) argue that fair value 
accounting (as opposed to historical cost accounting) may contribute to harmonization and 
comparability of international accounting, due to that for fair values the timing of 
measurements are “acceptable worldwide”, purchasing power changes do not cause such severe 
distortions over time where fair value is reported, values are location-independent when based 
on international market prices, and subjectivity is lessened because current prices are not entity-
specific. A positive reinforcement cycle is made possible as extended use of fair value in turn 
provides more globalized, harmonized capital markets, which in turn facilitate fair value 
accounting. Little reservation is shown toward the possibility of active markets being absent; 
potential reliability issues are believed to be dwarfed by the more serious problems caused by 
the local nature of historical cost accounting – both in time and geographically. The theoretical 
considerations in (Hitz 2007) lead to a considerably different conclusion: that the fair value 
income concept is lacking in its very formulation or existence, and that for non-financial items 
in thin markets this is even more obtrusive.  
                                                 
2 As an aside, in their case the use of fair values in the income statement gives little additional information when 
controlling for asset values as represented by changes in equity (cf. So and Smith 2009). 
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In order to see why the latter of these two opposing views carries some weight, the proposed 
definition of fair value will now be attended to, the three main features of which – orderly 
transaction, market participants, and measurement date – will be commented on subsequently, 
beginning with the overarching notion of an exit price. 
The exit price notion of fair value is not a problem in and of itself, as long as it represents a 
specific current value (“the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a 
liability” (IASB 2009b)) in a market-based exchange setting. Furthermore, with the 
unambiguous references to the market and the inclusion of ‘orderly’ [transaction], potential 
confusion surrounding the exit price is largely avoided; it precludes the possibility of treating it 
as a liquidation value. References to the market rather than to entity-specific events, further 
precludes any measurement based on value-in-use.  
The inconsistencies with the actual recommendations in the standard quickly amass, however. 
At first, it is seems reasonable that behind the fair value definition is the notion of market 
efficiency. If markets are efficient in the semi-strong form, prices efficiently impound publicly 
available information (Fama 1970), and the assumption that this holds can be deduced from the 
Boards’ justifications for fair value accounting (Milburn 2008) – that fair value is timely in its 
incorporation of information about current market conditions as well as representative of 
collective market beliefs and actual market volatility. So far, everything is in order, because the 
proposed fair value definition is consistent with market efficiency (which presumes open 
markets, active markets with ample transactions, public information that is bountifully 
available and market participants that are not compelled to transact (Milburn 2008)) and is 
promising under such assumptions.  
However, accepting that an exit price is a reasonable benchmark for fair value where market 
prices are easily available, the use of unobservable (level 3) inputs to estimate fair value 
introduces a caveat. (Milburn 2008) continues to provide insights here: in the new conceptual 
framework proposed by the IASB, faithful representation is defined as “the depiction of an 
economic phenomenon [that] is complete, neutral, and free from material error” (IASCF 2008). 
Although the “verifiability” criterion has been abandoned, the “free from material error” clause 
as well as the neutrality criterion, raise legitimate concerns regarding unobservable inputs (see 
Milburn 2008). The claim that “the fair value measurement objective [for level 3 inputs] 
remains the same, i.e. an exit price from the perspective of a market participant that holds the 
asset or owes the liability” (IASB 2009b, §53) is, as Milburn (2008) points out, an acutely 
flawed argument because “[h]aving an objective is not sufficient”. Furthermore, the valuation 
techniques suggested “can be very crude and rough bases for estimating fair values, especially 
when applied to non-contractual assets, and particularly when applied to non-contractual assets 
with highest and best uses in revenue-generating process (in-use assets)”. Clearly, significant 
reliance is on the individual’s judgments when making the estimates. Milburn (2008) uses the 
following as an example:  
“If multiple valuation techniques are used to measure fair value, the results … shall be 
evaluated and weighted, as appropriate, considering the reasonableness of the range of values 
indicated by those results. A fair value measurement is the point within that range that is most 
representative of fair value in the circumstances” (IASB 2009b, §39).  
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This particular phrasing is far from reassuring and can be seen as an unfortunate tautology.  
Despite the arguments put forth in the Basis for Conclusions for the Exposure Draft (IASB 
2009a), that the different levels of inputs do not necessitate any distinctions between, or 
different labels for, different types of fair value, Milburn (2008) summarizes rather well the 
overall view held by the authors:  
“[T]he concept of fair value implicit in the provisions of SFAS No. 157 [and the recent 
Exposure Draft] might, taken as a whole, be considered to comprise a family of current value 
measurement bases ranging from reasonably efficient market values to current cost and present 
value bases that are significantly dependent on entity expectations – all described as ‘fair 
value’” (Milburn 2008, p. 312). 
In other words, the proposed definition of fair value, with its reference to an exit price, is 
inconsistent with actual recommendations, because it is not strictly an exit price that is 
considered in the level 3 input scenario. In light of this, the empirical evidence considered 
earlier, i.e. the mixed relevance of fair value, is hardly surprising. 
Taking a step further, Hitz (2007) expresses his reservations toward model-based fair value by 
adopting as a starting point the information aggregation hypothesis: the notion that “market 
price aggregates in an efficient and virtually unbiased manner the consensus expectations of 
investors in the market concerning the cash flow pattern of the asset or liability” (Hitz, p. 328). 
This (along with the decision-usefulness paradigm) is a major driver of fair value accounting 
and may be considered acceptable if, and only if, there are functioning markets. 
“[M]odel-based fair value cannot, by definition, represent an aggregate of expectations 
dispersed in the market place: since valuation rests on the information set of one person or one 
organization, this fair value loses its capacity to efficiently collect and aggregate consensus 
expectations about the cash flow profile of the relevant position. The paradigmatic information 
aggregation assumption falters – a result that substantially questions standard setters’ 
theoretical reasoning on the desirability of fair value measurement. Rather than market 
information, model-based fair value inevitably incorporates management’s private information 
and assumptions, that is, elements of value in use. […] Curiously, model-based fair value is 
capable of creating useful information in the strict, information content sense, when credible 
communication of private management information takes place. Empirical evidence suggests 
this is happening (Barth and Clinch 1998; Beaver and Venkatachalam 2003). Accordingly, fair 
value measurement on the marking-to-model level receives vindication only where the fair 
value definition is violated and elements of value in use are incorporated. Obviously, this 
observation refutes rather than confirms the theoretical basis of fair value measurement.” (Hitz, 
p. 343-344) 
In view of this, the analysis by Whittington (2008) is compelling in that it underlines the need 
for entity-specific considerations in order for the information to be decision-useful; private 
information cannot and should not be ignored. If value-in-use is rejected on the basis that it is 
entity-specific and incorporates management skill (seen as the goodwill component 
distinguishing value-in-use from exit value (see Barth and Landsman 1995; Hitz 2007)), the 
relevance of the accounting measure may then be undermined since share prices have been 
shown to reflect these entity-specific features, i.e. investors value them (see Barth and 
Landsman 1995).  
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Moving on, the focus on market participants is consistent with the overall market orientation in 
the proposed standard and the definition satisfactorily expands on the previously shorter 
definition, “knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction”. However, as 
Milburn (2008) points out, the focus on market participants instead of markets “seems in 
danger of confusing entity-specific (market participant) values with market value”. Importantly, 
as Milburn (2008) also clarifies, the market is not a place where all market participants share 
the same view on what utility an asset might have; rather, through interaction of actors with 
different expectations, a consensus might be reached. This means that if there is no market 
process for the market (no active markets), can hypothetical, inevitably individual market 
participants act as stand-ins? This concern relates to the notion of the highest and best use of an 
asset, and especially the in-use valuation premise, as suggested in the Exposure Draft. How do 
you, in practice, determine what the highest and best use is? Can an active market ever be 
expected to exist for the in-use valuation premise, given the apparently scant likelihood that 
other firms have access to the same group of assets? If there is no active market and 
hypothetical prices must be sought for an asset which is not currently used to its full potential, 
how far do you go in search of a “market value”? Can the intentions and objectives of only a 
few independent, knowledgeable, willing and able market participants serve to determine the 
highest and best use? The authors have difficulty finding the answers to these questions. It is 
believed that where there are no observable inputs, estimating an exit price based on the highest 
and best use may in practice yield measurements that are unacceptably inaccurate, while still 
retaining the appearance of a market measure. 
The final part of the fair value definition, referring to the measurement date, also provokes 
concerns as the term can be considered ill-defined. It could be clarified that this refers to the 
balance sheet date when fair value is used. 
 
Answers to questions asked in the Exposure Draft 
Based on what has been said above, answers to some of the questions in the Exposure Draft are 
summarized below: 
Question 1 Definition of fair value 
The definition of fair value is acceptable when a market process exists, but is not consistent 
with the permissible practice of market estimates. The exit price becomes vague and reliability 
of the measure drops (either because of intentional bias in the estimates, or due to purely 
unsystematic measurement errors). Finally, market participants – especially hypothetical ones - 
seem to be poor substitutes for an actual market, and the measurement date concept needs to be 
expanded upon. 
Question 3 Most advantageous market 
This is defined as the most advantageous market to which the entity has access. In this respect 
the resulting value could become entity-specific rather than market-related. This contradicts the 
definition of fair value. 
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Question 4 Market participants 
To the extent that market participants are not well defined, this could be problematic. Cf. the 
answer to Question 1 above. 
Question 5 Highest and best use 
Guidance is thought to be largely principles-based in this part of the standard; what is meant in 
practice by the highest and best use when there is no active market is unclear. A concern is that 
without more detailed guidance on how to carry out this valuation in practice, the fair value 
estimates will reflect too much uncertainty or individual judgment, decreasing the value-
relevance of the reported amounts. It could also lead to an entity-specific rather than market-
related value, which contradicts the definition of fair value. 
Question 6 Used together with other assets 
See the answer to Question 5 above. 
Question 7 
Even though we cannot – based on the literature – provide a direct answer to the questions as 
posted, we can, however, conclude that it is relevant to measure financial liabilities at fair 
value, in spite of previous concerns regarding this. 
Question 10 Valuation techniques 
The use of valuation techniques as well as unobservable inputs receives scant support from 
extant empirical and theoretical research. The lack of reliability for mark-to-model 
measurements concerns the authors, cf. the answer to Question 1 above. 
Question 11 Disclosures 
In light of what has just been concluded, and as suggested by (Landsman 2007), it seems likely 
that disclosure of valuation assumptions and inputs may provide a (partial) remedy for the 
reliability issue and adverse selection facing fair values, especially for level 3 inputs of the 
hierarchy. We are therefore supportive of the guidance requiring extensive disclosure on fair 
value methods and inputs. 
Question 12 Convergence with US GAAP 
In general, the draft IFRS is more principles-based than SFAS 157, in that more judgment is 
permitted. This may lead to entity-specific values entering the fair value measurements. As 
suggested above, this in contradiction with the definition of fair value. In addition, the literature 
suggests that this lowers the quality of financial reporting. 
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